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In fact, as later explored by this note, the Supreme Court has recently
been issuing opinions that have made it harder for an inventor to obtain a
patent and easier for an accused infringer to invalidate a patent. 13 This
jeopardizes the strength of the American patent system, which in turn, directly jeopardizes American scientific innovation. 14 Patents are essential to
the American economy because they encourage the proliferation of technological advancement. Muddied patent jurisprudence hinders America’s
competitiveness in the global market. 15 Perhaps it is time for a more specialized court to be the final arbiter of patent matters.
This note aims to answer the following questions: 1) can Congress
strip the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction with respect to hearing
patent appeals; and 2) should Congress strip this jurisdiction? More specifically, Part II of this note analyzes important Supreme Court cases that
examine jurisdiction-stripping statutes before considering whether curtailing the Court’s jurisdiction from hearing patent cases would pass constitutional muster. This part also considers any ideological and policy concerns
associated with this type of statute. Part III explores the importance of patent law, and assesses recent Supreme Court patent law jurisprudence. The
note then concludes in Part IV with a reflection on whether this recent
precedent warrants a consideration of a jurisdiction-stripping statute.
II. CONGRESS CAN STRIP APPELLATE JURISDICTION FROM THE
SUPREME COURT
Jurisdiction-stripping legislation is not novel. 16 Throughout history,
the Court has considered various statutes attempting to limit its jurisdiction.
Many of these statutes have pertained to habeas corpus challenges, and the
Court has frequently narrowed its ruling to the specific facts in each case.
In order to synthesize the case law and apply their holdings to the patent
world, it is important to examine some of these jurisdiction-limiting statpatents claims they should not have upheld, but it has not indicated how to draw the line between
methods and molecules that are patent-eligible and those that are not.”).
13. Robert R. Sachs, One Year Anniversary: The Aftermath of #ALICESTORM, BILSKI BLOG,
FENWICK & WEST, (June 20, 2015), http://www.bilskiblog.com/blog/2015/06/the-one-year-anniversarythe-aftermath-of-alicestorm.html (“For example, in TC 1600, the biotech area, in January, 2012 6.81%
of all actions issued (counting both office actions and notices of allowances) were office actions with
§ 101 rejections; by May 2015 that percentage almost doubled to 11.86% of actions.”).
14. See generally William Hubbard, COMPETITIVE PATENT LAW, 65 FLA. L. REV. 341, 349
(2013).
15. See generally Neal Solomon, Connecting the Dots of a Weak Patent System and Productivity
Growth Decline, IPWATCHDOG (Oct. 4, 2016), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/10/04/weak-patentsystem-productivity-growth-decline/id=73433/.
16. See e.g., Hooper, supra note 1 at 512.
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utes more in depth. This section first analyzes Supreme Court precedent; it
subsequently examines the different ideological and policy concerns associated with jurisdiction-stripping statutes, coupled with an argument that
these concerns would not apply to the present inquiry.
A. Supreme Court Case Law on Jurisdiction-Stripping Statutes
One of the first times the Court grappled with a jurisdiction-stripping
statute was after the Civil War. In 1867, Congress passed an Act that gave
the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over habeas corpus actions. 17 William McCardle, who was imprisoned for publishing allegedly “incendiary
and libelous” articles, invoked habeas corpus and appealed the decision of
the lower court to the Supreme Court. 18 Before the Supreme Court issued
its opinion in 1868, Congress repealed the provision that gave the Court
appellate jurisdiction in these matters. 19 The Court noted that under the
Exceptions Clause, Congress had the power to alter appellate jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court. 20 The case was dismissed for want of jurisdiction;
however, Justice Chase explained, “[t]he act of 1868 does not except from
that jurisdiction any cases but appeals from Circuit Courts under the act of
1867.” 21 Therefore, the Court’s appellate power in cases of habeas corpus
was not completely eradicated. 22
Another pivotal attempt to restrict appellate review from the Supreme
Court came in 1996 when the Court granted certiorari in Felker v. Turpin. 23
With strong support from President Bill Clinton, Congress enacted The
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) of 1996. 24 The
Act contained a provision that restricted the Supreme Court’s appellate
power. 25 More specifically, the AEDPA contained a provision that prevent-

17. See Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 509 (1868).
18. Id. at 508.
19. Id. at 507–08.
20. Id. at 514.
21. Id. at 507–08.
22. See Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. 85, 106 (1868) (“Our conclusion is, that none of the acts prior to
1867, authorizing this court to exercise appellate jurisdiction by means of the writ of habeas corpus,
were repealed by the act of that year, and that the repealing section of the act of 1868 is limited in
terms, and must be limited in effect to the appellate jurisdiction authorized by the act of 1867.”).
23. 518 U.S. 651 (1996).
24. Grove, supra note 1, at 286–87.
25. Id. at 287.
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ed the Supreme Court from reviewing a Court of Appeals order denying
leave to file a second habeas petition by appeal or by writ of certiorari. 26
In Felker, the Supreme Court ruled on a narrow construction of the
provision. 27 In this case, the petitioner—convicted of murder, rape, false
imprisonment, and aggravated sodomy—filed both a motion for stay of
execution and a motion for leave to file a second or successive federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Code in the Eleventh Circuit. 28
The court denied both motions, and the petitioner filed a petition for writ of
habeas corpus for appellate review and for stay of execution in the U.S.
Supreme Court. 29
The Court first inquired whether or not the provisions of Title I of the
AEDPA, which amended existing federal habeas corpus law, 30 applied to
petitions for habeas corpus filed as original matters under 28 U.S.C. §§
2241 and 2254; 31 it concluded that, while § 2244(b)(3)(E) prohibited it
from reviewing a judgment on an application for leave to file a second
habeas petition in district court, Title I did not repeal the Court’s ability to
entertain original habeas petitions. 32 Therefore, the Court held, “since [the
Act] does not repeal our authority to entertain a petition for habeas corpus,
there can be no plausible argument that the Act has deprived this Court of
appellate jurisdiction in violation of Article III, § 2.” 33
The AEDPA was soon challenged again in conjunction with the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(“IIRIRA”). 34 These two acts contained amendments to the Immigration
and Nationality Act (“INA”), which raised questions concerning their effect on the availability of habeas corpus jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
2241. 35 In I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, the respondent, a lawful permanent resident of
the United States, pled guilty in state court to a charge of selling a controlled substance, which made him deportable. 36 At that time, the AEDPA
had not yet been enacted, and, at the discretion of the U.S. Attorney Gen26. Felker, 518 U.S. at 656. See also 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(e) (“The grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a second or successive application shall not be appealable and
shall not be the subject of a petition for rehearing or for a writ of certiorari.”).
27. Grove, supra note 1, at 289.
28. Felker, 518 U.S. at 657.
29. Id. at 658.
30. Id. at 656.
31. Id. at 658.
32. Id. at 658–62.
33. Id. at 661–62.
34. I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 292 (2001).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 293.
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eral, the respondent would have been eligible for a waiver of deportation. 37
However, his removal proceedings had not begun until after both the
AEDPA and IIRIRA had become effective, and accordingly, the Attorney
General interpreted the acts to mean that he no longer had discretion to
grant a waiver. 38 The Attorney General also argued that under these statutes, there was no judicial forum available to decide whether these statutes
deprived him of the power to grant this relief. 39 According to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”), four sections of the 1996 statutes
stripped the courts of jurisdiction with respect to the respondent’s habeas
corpus application. 40
The Court noted that in order for the INS to succeed, it had to overcome “both the strong presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative action and the longstanding rule requiring a clear statement of
congressional intent to repeal habeas jurisdiction.” 41 Additionally, the
Court stated, “Congress must articulate specific and unambiguous statutory
directives to effect a repeal.” 42 The Court indicated that 1) when a certain
interpretation of a statute “invokes the outer limits of Congress’ power,”
there should be a “clear indication that Congress intended that result,” and
2) if “an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious
constitutional problems, and where an alternative interpretation of the statute is ‘fairly possible,’”
the Court would be obligated to construe the statute to avoid the constitutional problems. 43 “A construction of the amendments at issue that
would entirely preclude review of a pure question of law by any court
would give rise to substantial constitutional questions.” 44 The Court ultimately concluded that habeas jurisdiction under § 2241 was not repealed by
AEDPA and IIRIRA since the absence of a judicial forum, “coupled with
the lack of a clear, unambiguous, and express statement of congressional
intent to preclude judicial consideration on habeas of such an important
question of law, strongly counsels against adopting a construction that
would raise serious constitutional questions.” 45
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 297
40. Id. at 298.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 299.
43. Id. at 299–300.
44. Id. at 300.
45. Id. at 314. See also id. at 305. (“It necessarily follows that a serious Suspension Clause issue
would be presented if we were to accept the INS’ submission that the 1996 statutes have withdrawn that
power from federal judges and provided no adequate substitute for its exercise.”). Additionally, the
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In a similar vein, the Supreme Court reviewed a provision of the INA
that limited judicial review of the Attorney General’s discretionary judgments regarding detention or release of any alien. 46 The respondent in
Demore v. Kim was convicted of first-degree burglary and “petty theft with
priors”; consequently, the INS detained him and charged him with being
deportable from the United States. 47 The respondent filed a habeas corpus
action challenging the constitutionality of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), 48 arguing
that his detention violated due process. 49
The Court first addressed the argument that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) deprived the Court of jurisdiction to entertain the case. 50 Section 1226(e)
stated that “[t]he Attorney General’s discretionary judgment regarding the
application of this section shall not be subject to review.” 51 It further stated
that “[n]o court may set aside any action or decision by the Attorney General under this section regarding the detention or release of any alien.” 52
With regard to the Act’s provisions, the Court held that they did not strip
the federal courts of the power to review a constitutional challenge to §
1226(c). 53 First, the respondent challenged the constitutionality of the statutory framework permitting his detention without bail; he did not challenge
the “discretionary judgment” or “decision” by the Attorney General. 54 Second, the Court “has held that ‘where Congress intends to preclude judicial
review of constitutional claims its intent to do so must be clear.’” 55 The
Court further stated, “where a provision precluding review is claimed to bar
habeas review, the Court has required a particularly clear statement that

Court stated that if it were to conclude the writ was no longer available in the present situation, its
holding would be a “departure from historical practice in immigration law.” It is also worth mentioning
that although the title of section 401(e) seems to show intent to preclude judicial review, the Court
noted that the actual text “merely repeals a subsection of the 1961 statute amending the judicial review
provisions of the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act,” and that neither the title nor the text mentions
28 U.S.C. § 2241. Id. at 308–09.
46. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 516 (2003).
47. Id. at 513.
48. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (dealing with mandatory detention and stating that “the Attorney General
shall take into custody any alien who” is removable based on a conviction of a specified crime).
49. Demore, 538 U.S. at 514.
50. Id. at 516.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 517.
54. Id. at 516–17.
55. Id. at 517; see also Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (finding that the language and structure of § 102(c) of the National Security Act indicated that Congress intended to commit individual
employee discharges to the Director of the CIA’s discretion, and that § 701(a)(2) precludes judicial
review of these decisions under the Administrative Procedure Act, but also holding that a constitutional
claim based on an individual discharge may be judicially reviewed by the District Court).
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VXFK LV &RQJUHVV¶ LQWHQW´ &RQVHTXHQWO\ WKH &RXUW H[SODLQHG WKDW 
 H GLG QRW H[SOLFLWO\ EDU KDEHDV UHYLHZ DQG IXUWKHU LWV ³FOHDU WH[W´
DOVRGLGQRWEDUWKHUHVSRQGHQW¶VFRQVWLWXWLRQDOFKDOOHQJH
$PRUHUHFHQWFKDOOHQJHWRDMXULVGLFWLRQVWULSSLQJSURYLVLRQDSSHDUHG
LQ,QHamdan v. RumsfeldWKH3UHVLGHQWGHHPHGWKHSHWLWLRQHUZKR
ZDVKHOGLQFXVWRG\DW*XDQWDQDPR%D\HOLJLEOHIRUWULDOE\PLOLWDU\FRP
PLVVLRQ7KHSHWLWLRQHUILOHGIRUDZULWRIKDEHDVFRUSXVDQGDUJXHGWKDW
WKH PLOLWDU\ FRPPLVVLRQ WKH 3UHVLGHQW FRQYHQHG ODFNHG DXWKRULW\ EHFDXVH
  ³QHLWKHU FRQJUHVVLRQDO $FW QRU WKH FRPPRQ ODZ RI ZDU VXSSRUWHG WULDO
E\ WKLV FRPPLVVLRQ IRU WKH FULPH RI FRQVSLUDF\´ DQG   WKH SURFHGXUHV
DGRSWHGE\WKH3UHVLGHQWWRWU\WKHSHWLWLRQHUYLRODWHGWKHPRVWEDVLFWHQHWV
RI PLOLWDU\ DQG LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ ZKLFK LQFOXGHG WKH VWDQGDUG WKDW D GH
IHQGDQWPXVWEHSHUPLWWHGWRVHHDQGKHDUWKHHYLGHQFHDJDLQVWKLP7KH
&RXUWILUVWDGGUHVVHGWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶VPRWLRQWRGLVPLVVWKHZULWRIFHUWL
RUDULXQGHUWKH'HWDLQHH7UHDWPHQW$FWRI ³'7$´ 
7KH*RYHUQPHQWDUJXHGWKDWFHUWDLQVXEVHFWLRQVRIWKH'7$UHSHDOHG
IHGHUDOMXULVGLFWLRQRYHUERWKSHQGLQJDQGIXWXUHGHWDLQHHKDEHDVDFWLRQV
7KH &RXUW QRWHG WKDW &RQJUHVV KDV H[SUHVVO\ SURYLGHG WKDW VHFWLRQV 
H   DQG H   RI WKH $FW ZKLFK JLYH H[FOXVLYH EXW OLP
LWHGMXULVGLFWLRQWRWKH&RXUW RI $SSHDOV IRU WKH 'LVWULFW RI&ROXPELD&LU
FXLW WR UHYLHZ ³ILQDO GHFLVLRQ>V@´ RI FRPEDWDQW VWDWXV UHYLHZ WULEXQDOV
³&657V´  DQG PLOLWDU\ FRPPLVVLRQV DSSOLHG WR SHQGLQJ FDVHV RQ WKH
FRQWUDU\ &RQJUHVV FKRVH QRW WR H[SUHVVO\ SURYLGH ZKHWKHU RU QRW VXEVHF
WLRQ H   ZKLFK DGGUHVVHV MXULVGLFWLRQ LQ KDEHDV FDVHV DQG RWKHU DFWLRQV
³UHODWLQJWRDQ\DVSHFWRIWKHGHWHQWLRQ´DSSOLHGWRFODLPVSHQGLQJRQWKH
GDWH RI HQDFWPHQW 6XEVHTXHQWO\ WKH &RXUW FRQFOXGHG WKDW &RQJUHVV¶
VLOHQFHJDYHULVHWRDQHJDWLYHLQIHUHQFHLQIDYRURIMXULVGLFWLRQDQGLWGH
QLHGWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶VPRWLRQWRGLVPLVV
$IWHU WKH Hamdan GHFLVLRQ &RQJUHVV HQDFWHG WKH 0LOLWDU\ &RPPLV
VLRQV $FW RI  ³0&$´  VHFWLRQ  RI ZKLFK DPHQGHG  86& 
 H 7KHDPHQGPHQWVSURYLGHGWKDW QRFRXUWMXVWLFHRUMXGJHZLOO
KDYHMXULVGLFWLRQWRKHDUDQDSSOLFDWLRQIRUDZULWRIKDEHDVFRUSXVILOHGE\
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an alien detained as an enemy combatant, and 2) except as provided in
sections 1005(e)(2) and (e)(3) of the DTA, no court, justice, or judge will
have jurisdiction to hear any other action against the United States relating
to any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of
confinement of a such alien. 65 Section 7(b) of the MCA provided that any
amendments made by 7(a) would apply to all cases, relating to any aspect
of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of detention of an
alien, pending on or after the date of the enactment. 66
In Boumediene, the petitioners, detainees of Guantanamo Bay, presented the question of whether or not they were entitled to the “constitutional privilege of habeas corpus, a privilege not to be withdrawn except in
conformance with the Suspension Clause.” 67 The Court ultimately held that
the Suspension Clause had full effect at Guantanamo Bay, and if Congress
wanted to deny the privilege of habeas corpus to the detainees, it must act
in accordance with the requirements of the Suspension Clause. 68 The Court
also decided that section 7 of the MCA was an unconstitutional suspension
of the writ of habeas corpus under the Suspension Clause because the DTA
review process was not an adequate substitute for the writ of habeas corpus; the Court specifically pointed out that the detainees did not have the
opportunity to present relevant exculpatory evidence not made part of the
record in earlier proceedings. 69
It is important to note that Congress’ power to strip jurisdiction is still
subject to Constitutional limitations, such as due process, equal protection,
and separations of powers. 70 For example, in United States v. Klein, Klein,
an administrator of the deceased V. F. Wilson, brought a claim in the Court
of Claims to recover the proceeds of cotton belonging to Wilson, which
came into the possession of agents of the Treasury Department as captured
or abandoned property during the Civil War. 71 Prior case law had held that
65. Id. at 736.
66. Id. at 736–37.
67. Id. at 732.
68. Id. at 771.
69. See id. at 792 (“To hold that the detainees at Guantanamo may, under the DTA, challenge the
President’s legal authority to detain them, contest the CSRT’s findings of fact, supplement the record on
review with exculpatory evidence, and request an order of release would come close to reinstating the §
2241 habeas corpus process Congress sought to deny them. The language of the statute, read in light of
Congress’ reasons for enacting it, cannot bear this interpretation.”).
70. Hooper, supra note 1 at 516; see also Battaglia v. Gen. Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254, 257 (2d
Cir. 1948) (stating that Congressional control over jurisdiction is subject to compliance with at least the
requirements of the Fifth Amendment, meaning that Congress must not exercise its power to restrict the
jurisdiction of the courts to deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of the
law, or to take private property without just compensation).
71. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 136 (1871).
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a presidential pardon was proof an individual was innocent in law; it would
be as if the individual never participated in the rebellion, and therefore, his
property would be dismissed from any penalty that he might have incurred. 72 Before the case could reach the Supreme Court, Congress passed
a statute abandoning this precedent, stating that without a disclaimer of
guilt, acceptance of a presidential pardon evidenced a person’s support of
the rebellion. 73 Furthermore, Congress stated that this pardon would be
taken as conclusive evidence of the act recited, and the court would not
have jurisdiction on proof of pardon or acceptance, summarily made on
motion or otherwise. 74 It also provided that the Supreme Court would have
no jurisdiction when the Court of Claims rendered a judgment based on the
pardons, without other proof of loyalty. 75
The Court stated that Congress had “passed the limit which separates
the legislative from the judicial power.” 76 It noted that Congress cannot
“prescribe a rule in conformity with which the court must deny to itself the
jurisdiction thus conferred, because and only because its decision, in accordance with settled law, must be adverse to the government and favorable to the suitor.” 77 Moreover, the Court noted that the proviso infringed
the constitutional power of the Executive to grant a pardon; it “impairs the
executive authority and directs the court to be instrumental to that end.” 78
Essentially, there was a separation of powers issue, and the statute was held
to be unconstitutional. 79
B. Application of Case Law to the Present Inquiry
A reasonable question to ask would be: how would these cases apply
to statutes limiting the Court’s appellate review of patent disputes? First, it
is important to note that McCardle and Felker are narrow holdings; although the Court discussed the Exceptions Clause, it recognized that the
statutes in question did not deprive the Court from entertaining all habeas
corpus petitions. So, what would happen if Congress wanted to strip jurisdiction from the Court with respect to all patent matters? Boumediene v.
Bush addressed these questions.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 132–33.
Id. at 133–34.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 147.
Id.
Id. at 148.
Id.
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In Boumediene, the Court held that the MCA deprived the federal
courts of jurisdiction to hear the contested habeas corpus actions. 80 As previously stated, the Court based its decision on the Suspension Clause,
which states, “[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety
may require it.” 81 The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is a privilege
enumerated in the Constitution, and the MCA deprived the federal courts
from hearing the detainee’s actions. If Congress were to strip jurisdiction
from the Supreme Court for patent cases, an inventor would still have access to the district courts and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
There would be no denial of access to a judicial forum, and no denial of a
Constitutional right. 82
Since Boumediene is distinguishable, we can look for guidance in
I.N.S., Demore, and Klein. I.N.S. and Demore do not speak to the constitutionality of limiting the Court’s patent jurisdiction; however, if Congress
were to pass a jurisdiction-stripping statute, the cases illustrate that Congress must have clear intent to do so. 83 Additionally, unlike in Klein, the
present inquiry would pass constitutional muster since it does not implicate
constraints on due process, equal protection, and separations of powers. 84
The federal courts, including the Federal Circuit, would still abide by the
basic principles of equal protection and due process. Moreover, although
Congress’ power to grant patents is rooted in the Constitution, most patent
challenges fall under statutory claims, not constitutional claims—a point
spelled out in further detail below. 85 Finally, there is no a separation of
powers issue since Congress has the constitutional power to govern patent
rights. Therefore, there is no case law that directly precludes a statute of
this nature.
C. Addressing Ideological and Policy Concerns of JurisdictionStripping Statutes
Because there is no case law that directly precludes Congress from
completely stripping the appellate jurisdiction from the Supreme Court
with respect to patent cases, this Note examines the ideological and policy
80. 553 U.S. 723, 723 (2008).
81. U.S. CONST. art. I § 9, cl. 2.
82. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 772 (2008) (“The gravity of the separation-of-powers issues
raised by these cases and the fact that these detainees have been denied meaningful access to a judicial
forum for a period of years render these cases exceptional.”).
83. See I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 299–300.
84. Hooper, supra note 1, at 516.
85. See infra Part I(c).
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concerns of similar statutes. In the United States, judicial power is enumerated in Article III of the Constitution. 86 Article III Section II defines the
scope of the Supreme Court’s appellate review in the Exceptions Clause. 87
This clause is the basis for the textual argument that Congress may restrict
Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction. 88 Supporters of a broad interpretation of Congress’ jurisdiction-stripping powers believe that this power
serves as a check on the unelected judiciary. 89 It allows members of Congress, a branch elected by the people, to restrain a branch insulated from
shifts in political winds. 90
Oppositionists to this broad interpretation also look to the text of Article III to make their argument, contending that the wording and structure of
Article III demonstrate a mandatory federal court jurisdiction beyond the
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction. 91 Even if Article III does not mandate the existence of lower federal courts, other scholars have argued that
all cases and controversies included under the judicial power in Article III
would still need to be heard by a federal court; consequently, if no inferior
federal courts existed, claims would need to be heard by the Supreme Court
on appeal. 92 In his article, Weiman contends that these arguments are
weakened in light of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which failed to “fully vest
the Article III judicial power in federal courts.” 93 He argues that federal
courts have historically been unable to hear certain cases (e.g., cases that do
not meet the amount-in-controversy requirements), even though they are
covered in Article III; therefore, the federal judiciary is not necessarily the
final arbiter in all matters anyhow. 94
Furthermore, the Weiman article references Professor Richard H. Fallon, who has identified two models of judicial federalism: the federalist
model and the nationalist model. 95 Individuals who prescribe to the nationalist model believe in the principles of federal supremacy; they may disagree with limiting federal court jurisdiction because they believe that
86. U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1–2.
87. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
88. Weiman, supra note 1, at 1684.
89. Id. at 1679.
90. Id. at 1685.
91. Id. at 1685–86 (referring to Justice Story’s dictum in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304,
331 (1816) (“It would seem, therefore, to follow, that congress are bound to create some inferior courts,
in which to vest all that jurisdiction which, under the constitution, is exclusively vested in the United
States, and of which the supreme court cannot take original cognisance (sic).”).
92. Id. at 1686.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1686–87.
95. Id. at 1692.
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federal courts are more apt at enforcing constitutional rights than state
courts. 96 Likewise, Weiman argues that stripping jurisdiction from the federal courts, specifically the Supreme Court, is that jurisdictional curtailment
would hinder the Court’s “essential functions.” 97 This idea of “essential
functions” revolves around the theory that the Supreme Court maintains the
supremacy of federal law and consistency in legal application. 98 For example, Professor Ratner has argued the “essential appellate functions under
the Constitution are: (1) to provide a tribunal for the ultimate resolution of
inconsistent or conflicting interpretations of federal law by state and federal
courts, and (2) to provide a tribunal for maintaining the supremacy of federal law when it conflicts with state law or is challenged by state authority.” 99 Through this theory, Professor Ratner contended that procedural
limitations restricting a litigant’s access to Supreme Court review would
not normally disrupt the essential functions; however, “legislation denying
the Court jurisdiction to review any case involving that subject would effectively obstruct those functions in the proscribed area.” 100
Despite the aforementioned ideological and policy concerns, Congress
should retain the right to limit the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction. First, it is
important to note that Congress does not always have a partisan motive
when it attempts to strip jurisdiction from the federal courts; rather, it’s

96. Id. at 1683–84.
97. Id. at 1688.
98. Id. Weiman argues that this is a weak argument because “[t]he fundamental problem with the
‘essential functions’ theory is that it has not been strongly rooted in constitutional text and fails to
explain why the Judiciary Act of 1789 limited federal court jurisdiction in a way that did not promote
uniformity of law.” Id. at 1688.Weisman argues that a narrowed version of this theory would more
“appropriately represent the text of the Constitution, the views of the framers, and the historical applications thereafter in laws such as the 1789 Judiciary Act;” “[u]nder this theory, the clear minimum requirement upon Congress would be to maintain ultimate federal court review of state court rulings
against constitutional claims.” Id. at 1699. See also id. at 1705 (quoting Lawrence Gene Sager, Constitutional Limitations on Congress’ Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95
HARV. L. REV. 17, 44 (1981), who states “[a]s will shortly become clear, I think that the essential
function claim is strongest when narrowed to Supreme Court review of state court decisions that repudiate federal constitutional claims of right.”) Patent law has exclusive federal jurisdiction, and the cases
and controversies at issue do not deal with constitutional challenges; therefore, the jurisdiction-stripping
statute in question would easily survive this narrow interpretation.
99. Leonard G. Ratner, Congressional Power over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157, 161 (1960).
100. Id. “But legislation that precludes Supreme Court review in every case involving a particular
subject is an unconstitutional encroachment on the Court’s essential functions.” Id. at 201.
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motive is much more practical. 101 Furthermore, a complete bar to this congressional power would be direct hindrance to Congress. 102
Congress has the constitutional right to govern patents; 103 under the
Exceptions Clause, Congress also has the power to utilize this right to govern patent law by shifting final adjudication of patent appeals from the
Supreme Court to another court. The two main arguments against stripping
jurisdiction from the Supreme Court are that 1) under a nationalist model of
judicial federalism, federal courts are better at enforcing constitutional
rights than state courts; and 2) stripping jurisdiction from the Supreme
Court to entertain cases regarding an entire area of law would obstruct the
Court’s essential functions.
The first issue would not be relevant in the present inquiry. Title 35 of
the United States Code codifies substantive patent law; cases and controversies primarily deal with infringement and validity matters, rather than
constitutional challenges. Even if a constitutional challenge were to
arise, 104 there would not be an issue of “federal supremacy,” considering
that patent law is governed exclusively by federal law. 105 Therefore, patent
law is not subject to discrepancies between state courts and federal
courts. 106
With respect to the second issue, there is no concern regarding the
presence of “a tribunal for the ultimate resolution of inconsistent or con101. See Nicole A. Heise, Stripped: Congress and Jurisdiction Stripping, 3 FAULKNER L. REV. 1
(2011) (citing administrative concerns, like increases in litigation against the federal government, as
Congress’ catalyst for removing jurisdiction from the courts).
102. Sager, supra note 98 (“Likewise, these views would prevent Congress from establishing
special tribunals—in such areas as tax, patent, copyright, or admiralty—whose judgments would be
immune from Supreme Court review.”).
103. Congress has the power to promote the progress of science by granting inventors the exclusive rights to their discoveries- a power that the Framer’s intended to be broad. In Federalist Paper No.
43, James Madison referenced the Patent and Copyright clause and concluded that “the utility of this
power will scarcely be questioned.” THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (James Madison). But see Gene Quinn,
The Constitutional Underpinnings of Patent Law, IPWATCHDOG (May 11, 2011),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2011/05/11/the-constitutional-underpinnings-of-patent-law/id=16865
(citing Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966), who notes “[t]he clause is both
a grant of power and a limitation. This qualified authority, unlike the power often exercised in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by the English Crown, is limited to the promotion of advances in
the ‘useful arts.”).
104. See MCM Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 812 F.3d 1284, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert.
denied sub nom. MCM Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co. (U.S. Oct. 11, 2016) (patentee argued that
inter partes review was unconstitutional because “any action revoking a patent must be tried in an
Article III court with the protections of the Seventh Amendment.”).
105. 28 USC § 1338(a) (2012).
106. It is worth noting that under the AIA, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”) is the
correct forum for post-grant review (PGR) and inter partes review (IPR) proceedings. Decisions from
the Patent Trial and Appeal Board regarding these proceedings, however, are appealable to the Federal
Circuit.
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flicting interpretations of federal law by state and federal courts.” 107 As
stated above, a state court does not have jurisdiction to hear a patent
case. 108 However, one may argue that there still may be conflicts among the
different district courts. This is obviated by the existence of the Federal
Circuit, a congressionally created court that has appellate jurisdiction over
the district courts with respect to patent cases. The Federal Circuit may
behave as the tribunal for the ultimate resolution of inconsistent or conflicting interpretations of patent law; it can set precedent, thereby unifying the
lower courts.
III. CONGRESS SHOULD CONSIDER A STATUTE STRIPPING THE
SUPREME COURT’S APPELLATE REVIEW OF PATENT CASES
After determining that Congress likely can strip appellate jurisdiction
from the Supreme Court with respect to patent cases, it is now time to turn
to the following question: should Congress strip this jurisdiction? As examined below, the Supreme Court has taken an increasing interest in patent
law in recent years, which has seemingly engendered anti-patent precedent.
Before delving into the case law, it is essential to understand why patent
law is important to the American public. After that analysis, we will examine how recent decisions by the Supreme Court have had adverse effects on
the current state of patent law. This will help us consider whether or not
jurisdiction-stripping legislation would be appropriate.
A. Patent Law is Essential for Innovation and Vital for the Economy
Technological advancements and scientific discoveries are imperative
for societal progression. In fact, “[t]he economic philosophy behind the
clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best
way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors
in ‘Science and useful Arts.’” 109 Anti-patent sentiment and muddied jurisprudence is lethal to the patent system, which for two centuries has been
vital to the American economic success. 110
107. Ratner, supra note 99 at 161.
108. But see Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1065 (2013) (“State legal malpractice claims based
on underlying patent matters will rarely, if ever, arise under federal patent law for purposes of §
1338(a).”).
109. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
110. See generally Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Acting Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at
The Economic Contribution of Technology Licensing Conference USPTO’s Global Intellectual Property Academy 6 (June 8, 2016),
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and global economy, it is imperative that courts, at the least, remain neutral
when deciding patent cases—even preferably erring on the side of the patentee. Anti-patent sentiment could spell out danger for both American
innovation and the American economy.
B. The Current State of Patent Law
Now that this Note has illustrated the importance that patents hold in
our society, we must turn our attention to the Supreme Court’s objectionable treatment of patent law. First, the Supreme Court has been reversing
very important decisions by the Federal Circuit, a court Congress specifically created to hear specialized cases. Next, the Supreme Court has been
misinterpreting Congress’ interpretation of Title 35 as well as the scientific
and technical facts behind certain cases. These reversals, as well as the
ongoing legal and factual misinterpretations, have created confusion in
patent law jurisprudence, which in turn has made it more difficult for an
inventor to both obtain and retain a patent.
1. The Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit: A Love Story Gone
Wrong.
In the beginning, the Supreme Court mainly left the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit at peace; however, in recent years, the Supreme
Court has ostensibly been disregarding Federal Circuit jurisprudence. 120 In
1982, Congress established the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“Federal Circuit”). Congress created the Federal Circuit in order to
Patent Court Agreement is a treaty between certain European Union member states creating a single
Unified Patent Court system; the UPC will handle infringement and validity cases for participating EU
states. For more information on the Unified Patent Court, see An Enhanced European Patent System,
UPC (Jan. 20, 2016), http://www.unified-patent-court.org/images/documents/enhanced-europeanpatent-system.pdf;20, 2016; see also UP & UPC FAQs, FISH & RICHARDSON (July 12, 2016),
http://www.fr.com/global/unitary-patent-faqs/.http://www.fr.com/global/unitary-patent-faqs/.
120. Since its creation, the Federal Circuit has elicited strong criticism among legal scholars. One
argument is that since the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over patent law appeals, there is
little room for different legal interpretations to be tried and tested among the various circuits. Many
people feel that the Federal Circuit is very pro-patent, arguing that a specialized court with exclusive
jurisdiction would be inherently biased. See Zachary Shapiro, Patent Law, Expertise, and the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, BILL OF HEALTH BLOG (July 14, 2015),
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/billofhealth/2015/07/14/patent-law-expertise-and-the-court-of-appeals-forthe-federal-circuit.). However, this bias pales in comparison to the confusing and seemingly anti-patent
precedent set by the Supreme Court. Furthermore, critics of the Federal Circuit also argue that patent
law should not be treated “differently” from other areas of law. The argument is that patent cases are
actually not inherently more challenging than any other type of law. See Wood, supra note 11. On the
contrary, patent law is a distinct field, whose jurisprudence affects the American economy. Additionally, it is still one of the few fields that requires a separate bar examination, which further demonstrates
its legal uniqueness.
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provide more “certain areas of federal jurisdiction and relieve the pressure
on the dockets of the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals for the regional circuits.” 121 The Federal Circuit was formed after years of extensive
research and study. 122 Results of this study pointed to problems associated
with the lack of uniformity in specialized areas of law, including patent
law. 123 Congress extended the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit so that
they “had the power to review appeals from the U.S. Court of International
Trade, the Merit Services Protection Board, the board of contract appeals,
and certain administrative decisions of the secretaries of Agriculture and
Commerce, as well as all appeals related to patents.” 124
The Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit have a recent history of
tension. For example, between 2005 and 2015, the Supreme Court heard 27
patent appeals from the Federal Circuit, and the Court reversed 22 of
them. 125 The Supreme Court grants certiorari to many of these cases in
attempts to synchronize patent law with the rest of the law. The Federal
Circuit, however, narrowly applies these rulings. For instance, the Federal
Circuit held that isolated DNA was patentable twice before the Supreme
Court finally reversed Myriad. 126 Speaking about the uniformity of circuit
court decisions, Chief Justice John Roberts even joked, “Well, they don’t
have a choice, right? They can’t say, ‘I don’t like the Supreme Court rule,
so I’m not going to apply it—other than the Federal Circuit.’” 127

121. Landmark
Judicial
Legislation,
FED.
JUD.
CTR.,
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/landmark_22.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2016).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Steven Seidenberg, Tug-of-war over Interpretations of Patent Law Continues between Federal Circuit and SCOTUS, ABA J., (Jan. 1, 2016, 3:00 AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/tug_of_war_over_interpretations_of_patent_law_continue
s_between_federal. See also Timothy B. Dyk, Thoughts on the Relationship Between the Supreme
Court and the Federal Circuit, 16 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 67, 67 (2016) (“In the past ten years, the
Supreme Court has taken an average of four of our cases each term, representing 5.4% of the Court’s
merits cases. A large proportion of those cases have involved substantive patent law or related procedural issues.”).
126. Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111 (2013).
127. Seidenberg, supra note 125 (citing oral arguments for Carlsbad Technology Inc. v. HIF Bio
Inc.). See also Biosig Instruments, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc., 783 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (holding, on
remand, that under the Supreme Court’s revised “reasonable certainty” test, the claims still complied
with Section 112). In this case, the Federal Circuit stated, “we may now steer by the bright star of
‘reasonable certainty,’ rather than the unreliable compass of ‘insoluble ambiguity,’” which can be
construed as a “snarky” response to the Supreme Court’s shift from the “insolubly ambiguous” standard
to the reasonable certainty test. Erin Coe, The Battle for Patent Law: Federal Circuit Looks to Hold the
Line as Supreme Court Eyes IP, LAW360 (July 9, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/814461/thebattle-for-patent-law.
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A recent example of the tension between the Federal Circuit and the
Supreme Court can be seen in the Federal Circuit’s opinion in Apple v.
Samsung, 128 which collides with the Supreme Court’s ruling in eBay v.
MercExchange. 129 In eBay, the Supreme Court stated that Court of Appeals
did not correctly apply the traditional four-factor framework that governs
the award of injunctive relief, but instead used a unique “general rule that a
permanent injunction will issue once infringement and validity have been
adjudged.” The Circuit felt injunctions should only be denied in the “‘unusual case’, ‘under ‘exceptional circumstances’ and ‘in rare instances . . . to
protect the public interest.’” 130 The four-factor test that the Court applied is
the same four-factor test applied in other civil cases involving awarding
permanent injunctive relief. This four-factor test states that
A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance
of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is
warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a
permanent injunction. 131

In the aftermath of this case, patentees acquired far fewer injunctions,
and “[t]hey also found it nearly impossible to obtain an injunction when an
infringed patent was just a tiny part of a large, complex product or service.” 132 This was because courts have consistently held that an infringing
element must drive consumer demand in order for irreparable harm to exist. 133
This holding is in tension with the recent Apple v. Samsung decision. 134 In its opinion, the Federal Circuit adopted a pro-patentee interpretation of “irreparable harm.” 135 Furthermore, in relation to the last factor of
the test, the Federal Circuit went on to say that
[w]e base this conclusion not only on the Patent Act’s statutory right to
exclude, which derives from the Constitution, but also on the importance
of the patent system in encouraging innovation. Injunctions are vital to
this system. As a result, the public interest nearly always weighs in favor

128. Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 809 F.3d 633, 647 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
129. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 395 (2006). See Seidenberg, supra note
125 (discussing the difficulty in reconciling Apple v. Samsung with eBay, Inc.).
130. eBay, Inc., 547 U.S. 388, 393–94 (citing MercExchange, LLC v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d, at
1338).
131. Id. at 391.
132. Seidenberg, supra note 125.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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RISURWHFWLQJSURSHUW\ULJKWVLQWKHDEVHQFHRIFRXQWHUYDLOLQJIDFWRUVHV
SHFLDOO\ZKHQWKHSDWHQWHHSUDFWLFHVKLVLQYHQWLRQV

7KLV SURSDWHQWHH VHQWLPHQW FRQWUDVWV ZLWK WKH VHQWLPHQW VHW RXW LQ
eBay ZKLFK DGYRFDWHG IRU D PRUH QHXWUDO DSSURDFK ,Q KHU GLVVHQWLQJ
RSLQLRQ&KLHI-XGJH3URVWHYHQPHQWLRQVWKHLQFRPSDWLELOLW\RIWKHPDMRUL
W\¶VRSLQLRQZLWKWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQLQeBay
$OWKRXJK&RQJUHVVFUHDWHGWKLVVSHFLDOFRXUWWRDQDO\]HSDWHQWFDVHV
WKH6XSUHPH&RXUWKDVEHHQWU\LQJWRHQIRUFHLWVRZQSDWHQWLQWHUSUHWDWLRQV
XSRQWKH)HGHUDO&LUFXLW7KLVODFNRIGHIHUHQFHKDVFUHDWHGDWHQVLRQEH
WZHHQWKHWZRFRXUWV7KLVWHQVLRQOLNHO\VWHPVIURPWKHIDFWWKDWWKH)HG
HUDO&LUFXLWKDVDPRUHIRUPDODSSURDFKLQH[SUHVVLQJUXOHVRIODZ:KLOH
VRPH IHHO WKDW WKLV µIRUPDOLW\¶ KDV KDG DGYHUVH HIIHFWV RQ SDWHQW ODZ LW
DUJXDEO\ SURPRWHV FHUWDLQW\ DQG XQLIRUPLW\ LQ SDWHQW ODZ ZKLOH WKH 6X
SUHPH&RXUW¶VIDVFLQDWLRQZLWKDEVWUDFWLRQDQGIOH[LELOLW\KDVPDGHLWHDVLHU
WRLQYDOLGDWHSDWHQWV
)RUH[DPSOHWKH6XSUHPH&RXUWKDVPDGHLWHDVLHUIRUDSDWHQWWREH
IRXQGLQYDOLGRQWKHEDVLVRIREYLRXVQHVVKSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.KDV
FRQVLGHUDEO\ LQIOXHQFHG WKH ODZ RI REYLRXVQHVV XQGHU  86& 
KHUHLQDIWHU³´ ,QWKLVFDVH7HOHIOH[DOOHJHGWKDW.65,QWHUQDWLRQDO

  $SSOH,QFY6DPVXQJ(OHFV&R,)G )HG&LU 
  6HLGHQEHUJsupra QRWH
  Apple Inc.  )G DW ± 3URVW &- GLVVHQWLQJ  ³%XW , DP FRQILGHQW WKDW ZH DOO
UHPDLQPLQGIXOWKDWSUHeBay,µ>D@FFRUGLQJWRWKH&RXUWRI$SSHDOVWKLVVWDWXWRU\ULJKWWRH[FOXGHDORQH
MXVWLILH>G@LWVJHQHUDOUXOHLQIDYRURISHUPDQHQWLQMXQFWLYHUHOLHI¶7KH6XSUHPH&RXUWKRZHYHUXQDQ
LPRXVO\UHMHFWHGWKDWDSSURDFKUHDVRQLQJWKDWµWKHFUHDWLRQRIDULJKWLVGLVWLQFWIURPWKHSURYLVLRQRI
UHPHGLHV IRU YLRODWLRQV RI WKDW ULJKW¶ )RU WKH VDPH UHDVRQ WKH VWDWXWRU\ ULJKW WR H[FOXGH VKRXOG QRW
FDWHJRULFDOO\ELDVWKHSXEOLFLQWHUHVWIDFWRUµstrongly¶LQWKHGHWHUPLQDWLRQRIWKHLQMXQFWLYHUHPHGLHVDV
WKHPDMRULW\DVVHUWV´  LQWHUQDOFLWDWLRQVRPLWWHG 
  7LPRWK\ 5 +ROEURRN The Supreme Court’s Complicity in Federal Circuit Formalism 
6$17$ &/$5$ &20387(5  +,*+ 7(&+ /-  See also +DOR(OHFWURQLFV,QFY3XOVH(OHF
WURQLFV,QF6&W   DEURJDWLQJIn re 6HDJDWH7HFK//&)G )HG
&LU DQGKROGLQJWKDWWKH)HGHUDO&LUFXLW¶VWZRSDUWWHVWIRUHQKDQFHGGDPDJHVXQGHU3DWHQW$FW
ZDV³XQGXO\ULJLGDQGLWLPSHUPLVVLEO\HQFXPEHUVWKHVWDWXWRU\JUDQWRIGLVFUHWLRQWRGLVWULFWFRXUWV´ 
2FWDQH)LWQHVV//&Y,&21+HDOWK )LWQHVV,QF6&W   KROGLQJWKDW³DQ
µH[FHSWLRQDO¶FDVHLVVLPSO\RQHWKDWVWDQGVRXWIURPRWKHUVZLWKUHVSHFWWRWKHVXEVWDQWLYHVWUHQJWKRID
SDUW\¶VOLWLJDWLQJSRVLWLRQ FRQVLGHULQJERWKWKHJRYHUQLQJODZDQGWKHIDFWVRIWKHFDVHRUWKHXQUHDVRQ
DEOHPDQQHULQZKLFKWKHFDVHZDVOLWLJDWHG 7KHODWWHUFDVHDEURJDWHG%URRNV)XUQLWXUH0IJ,QFY
'XWDLOLHU,QW¶O,QF)G )HG&LU WKH&RXUWKHOGWKDW³>W@KHIUDPHZRUNHVWDEOLVKHGE\
WKH )HGHUDO &LUFXLW LQ%URRNV )XUQLWXUHLV XQGXO\ ULJLG DQG LW LPSHUPLVVLEO\ HQFXPEHUV WKH VWDWXWRU\
JUDQWRIGLVFUHWLRQWRGLVWULFWFRXUWV´Id.DW
  See /DXUD * 3HGUD]D)DULxD, Understanding the Federal Circuit: An Expert Community
Approach,  %(5.(/(< 7(&+ /-    ³7KH )HGHUDO &LUFXLW¶V V\VWHPDWLF SUHIHUHQFH IRU
IRUPDOULJLGUXOHVRYHUIOH[LEOHVWDQGDUGVPDQ\FRPPHQWDWRUVEHOLHYHKDVFRQWULEXWHGWRSDWHQWODZ¶V
GLVFRQQHFWIURPWKHQHHGVRIFRPPXQLWLHVRILQQRYDWRUVZRUNLQJLQD TXLFNO\HYROYLQJWHFKQRORJLFDO
HQYLURQPHQW´ 
  .65,QW¶O&RY7HOHIOH[,QF86±  
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had infringed its patent for an adjustable pedal system. 142 KSR counter
claimed that the patent was obvious under 103.143 The Court ruled in favor
of KSR, and established principles to help determine obviousness.144 In its
opinion, the Court held that the “teaching-suggestion-motivation test” utilized by the Federal Circuit was helpful insight to identify a reason for
combining prior art; however, the Court stated that it should not be used as
a strict rule. 145
The Court stated that it would be necessary for a court to look to “interrelated teachings of multiple patents; the effects of demands known to
the design community or present in the marketplace; and the background
knowledge possessed by a person having ordinary skill in the art, all in
order to determine whether there was an apparent reason to combine the
known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue.” 146 Moreover, according to the Court, a court may take into account the “inferences
and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” 147 This shows that, according to the Court, combination patents deserve extra scrutiny, which may present a concern of hindsight bias. 148
According to an article from the Albany Law Journal, district courts studied in the article were over seven times more likely to find patents obvious
based on the KSR holding, and the Federal Circuit was 40%–57% more
likely to find a patent obvious on review. 149
Consistency is important for a field that is so closely tied with the
American economy. As this Note will explore further in its next section,
these flexible approaches not only create inconsistency, but they also are
purportedly harmful for patents. Furthermore, by setting these new standards, the Court is not just rejecting the Federal Circuit’s patent law juris142. Id. at 405–06.
143. Id. at 406.
144. Id. at 415–18. (“When a work is available in one field of endeavor, design incentives and
other market forces can prompt variations of it, either in the same field or a different one. If a person of
ordinary skill can implement a predictable variation, § 103 likely bars its patentability. For the same
reason, if a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art
would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious
unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill. Sakraida and Anderson’s–Black Rock are illustrative—a court must ask whether the improvement is more than the predictable use of prior art elements
according to their established functions.”).
145. Id. at 419.
146. Id. at 418.
147. Id. See also id. at 421 (“A person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not
an automaton.”).
148. See id. at 421.
149. Ali Mojibi, An Empirical Study of the Effect of KSR v. Teleflex on the Federal Circuit’s
Patent Validity Jurisprudence, 20 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 559, 596 (2010),
http://www.albanylawjournal.org/documents/articles/20.3.559-mojibi.pdf.
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SUXGHQFH LW LV DOVR GHFOLQLQJ WR WDNH LQWR DFFRXQW &RQJUHVV¶ OHJLVODWLYH
LQWHQW
7KH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶V'HDUWKRI&RQJUHVVLRQDO'HIHUHQFH
$ORQJ ZLWK GLVDYRZLQJ WKH FRQJUHVVLRQDOO\ FUHDWHG )HGHUDO &LUFXLW
WKH 6XSUHPH &RXUW KDV DOVR UHIXVHG WR GHIHU WR &RQJUHVV ZLWK UHVSHFW WR
VWDWXWRU\LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ7LWOHJRYHUQVDVSHFWVRISDWHQWODZ86&
 KHUHLQDIWHU ³ ´  VWDWHV WKDW ³>Z@KRHYHU LQYHQWV RU GLVFRYHUV DQ\
QHZ DQG XVHIXO SURFHVV PDFKLQH PDQXIDFWXUH RU FRPSRVLWLRQ RI PDWWHU
RUDQ\QHZDQGXVHIXOLPSURYHPHQWWKHUHRIPD\REWDLQDSDWHQWWKHUHIRU
VXEMHFW WR WKH FRQGLWLRQV DQG UHTXLUHPHQWV RI WKLV WLWOH´ $ SLYRWDO FDVH
LQWHUSUHWLQJ WKLV VWDWXWH LV Diamond v. Chakrabarty ,Q WKLV FDVH WKH
&RXUWVWDWHGWKDWWKHUHOHYDQWOHJLVODWLYHKLVWRU\VXSSRUWHGDEURDGFRQVWUXF
WLRQRI:KHQDXWKRULQJWKH3DWHQW$FWRI7KRPDV-HIIHUVRQ
KHOGWUXHWRKLVEHOLHIWKDWLQJHQXLW\VKRXOGEHWUHDWHGOLEHUDOO\DQGKHGH
ILQHGVWDWXWRU\VXEMHFWPDWWHUDV´DQ\QHZDQGXVHIXODUWPDFKLQHPDQX
IDFWXUH RU FRPSRVLWLRQ RI PDWWHU RU DQ\ QHZ RU XVHIXO LPSURYHPHQW
>WKHUHRI@´,QSDWHQWODZZDVUHFRGLILHGDQGLQWKHDFFRPSDQ\LQJ
&RPPLWWHH 5HSRUWV &RQJUHVV VWDWHG WKDW LW LQWHQGHG SDWHQWDEOH VXEMHFW
PDWWHUWR³LQFOXGHDQ\WKLQJXQGHUWKHVXQWKDWLVPDGHE\PDQ´(PEUDF
LQJ WKLV SULQFLSOH WKH &RXUW VWLOO GHFLGHG WKDW WKHUH ZHUH WKUHH LQKHUHQWO\
SDWHQWLQHOLJLEOHVXEMHFWPDWWHUVODZVRIQDWXUHSK\VLFDOSKHQRPHQDDQG
DEVWUDFWLGHDV
'HVSLWH &RQJUHVV¶ LQWHQGHG OLEHUDO LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ WKH 6XSUHPH &RXUW
KDVUHFHQWO\EHHQWDNLQJDPRUHFRQVHUYDWLYHDSSURDFKWRLQWHUSUHWD
WLRQV )RU H[DPSOH WKH &RXUW GHFLGHG WR IXUWKHU OLPLW SDWHQWHOLJLELOLW\ LQ
WKHUHFHQWMayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.
,Q WKLV FDVH WKH &RXUW KHOG WKDW WKH SURFHVV FODLPV DW LVVXH ZHUH SDWHQW
LQHOLJLEOHDFFRUGLQJWRWKH&RXUWWKHFODLPVZHUHGLUHFWHGWRDSURFHVVIRU
GHWHUPLQLQJ ZKHWKHU D JLYHQ GRVDJH OHYHO RI WKLRSXULQH WR WUHDW SDWLHQWV
ZLWKDXWRLPPXQHGLVHDVHVZDVWRRORZRUWRRKLJK7KHLGHDEHKLQGWKH
SDWHQWVZDVWRORRNDWWKHFRUUHODWLRQEHWZHHQWKHOHYHORIPHWDEROLWHVLQD
SDWLHQW¶VEORRGVWUHDPDQGWKHHIIHFWLYHQHVVRIWKHGUXJDJDLQVWDXWRLPPXQH



















86&  
'LDPRQGY&KDNUDEDUW\86  
Id. DW
Id FLWLQJ$FWRI)HE6WDW 
IdDW FLWLQJ65(312  +55(312  
Id. 
0D\R&ROODERUDWLYH6HUYVY3URPHWKHXV/DEV,QF6&W  
Id. DW
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diseases, like Crohn’s disease. 158 The Court held that these claims covered
phenomena of nature, and any additional steps were “well-understood,
routine, conventional activity already engaged in by the scientific community.” 159 In this decision, Justice Breyer admitted that the additional steps in
the claim “are not themselves natural laws;” however, he continued that the
additional steps still did not transform the nature of the claim. 160 This interpretation seemingly goes against Congress’ legislative intent for a broad
construction of § 101.
Further interpreting the test delineated in Mayo, the Court decided Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank in 2014. 161 In this case, the Supreme Court held that
the claims on review contained patent-ineligible subject matter. 162 The
Court relied on a two-part test to determine eligibility set out in Mayo. 163
First, the Court determined whether the claims were directed to an abstract
idea. In Alice, the Court turned to Bilski v. Kappos to analyze the category
of abstract ideas. 164 In Bilski, the Court concluded that the claims were
directed to a method for hedging against the financial risk of price fluctuations. 165 Using this precedent for its decision, the Court stated that the
claims in Alice were directed to “using a third-party intermediary to mitigate settlement risk.” 166 Much like the claims in Bilski, the Court felt the
claims in Alice encompassed “a fundamental economic practice long prevalent in our system of commerce.” 167
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1297. (“To put the matter more succinctly, the claims inform a relevant audience about
certain laws of nature; any additional steps consist of well-understood, routine, conventional activity
already engaged in by the scientific community; and those steps, when viewed as a whole, add nothing
significant beyond the sum of their parts taken separately. For these reasons we believe that the steps
are not sufficient to transform unpatentable natural correlations into patentable applications of those
regularities.”).
161. 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
162. Id. at 2352.
163. Id. at 2355 (The first step in the test is to determine whether the claims at issue are directed to
a patent-ineligible concept; if yes, a court must ask “[w]hat else is there in the claims before us? [A
court should] consider the elements of each claim both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’ to
determine whether the additional elements ‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible
application.”).
164. Id. at 2355.
165. Id. at 2355–56 (citing Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 599 (2010)) (“Claim 1 [in Bilski]
recited a series of steps for hedging risk, including: (1) initiating a series of financial transactions
between providers and consumers of a commodity; (2) identifying market participants that have a
counterrisk for the same commodity; and (3) initiating a series of transactions between those market
participants and the commodity provider to balance the risk position of the first series of consumer
transactions. Claim 4 ‘pu[t] the concept articulated in claim 1 into a simple mathematical formula.’”)
(internal citations omitted).
166. Id. at 2356.
167. Id.
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1H[WWKH&RXUWVHDUFKHGIRUDQLQYHQWLYHFRQFHSWUHDVRQLQJWKDWLIDQ
LGHDLVDEVWUDFWWKHUHPXVWEHDGGLWLRQDOHOHPHQWVRIWKHFODLPHLWKHUDORQH
RULQDQRUGHUHGFRPELQDWLRQWRWUDQVIRUPWKHDEVWUDFWFODLPLQWRSDWHQWD
EOHVXEMHFWPDWWHU$WWKHHQGRIWKLVGHFLVLRQWKH&RXUWKHOGWKDW³WKH
PHUHUHFLWDWLRQRIDJHQHULFFRPSXWHUFDQQRWWUDQVIRUPDSDWHQWLQHOLJLEOH
DEVWUDFWLGHDLQWRDSDWHQWHOLJLEOHLQYHQWLRQ´7KHUHIRUHWKH&RXUWKHOG
WKDWWKHSHWLWLRQHU¶VV\VWHPDQGPHGLDFODLPVDGGHGQRWKLQJRIVXEVWDQFHWR
WKHXQGHUO\LQJDEVWUDFWLGHDFRQVHTXHQWO\WKH\ZHUHSDWHQWLQHOLJLEOHXQ
GHU
7KLVFDVHKDVEHHQDKDOOPDUNGHFLVLRQLQWKHSDWHQWZRUOGPDLQO\EH
FDXVHRILWVGLVPDOHIIHFWVRQSDWHQWHOLJLELOLW\2QHELJLVVXHZLWKWKLVGH
FLVLRQLVWKDWWKH&RXUWVWDWHG³>L@QDQ\HYHQWZHQHHGQRWODERUWRGHOLPLW
WKH SUHFLVH FRQWRXUV RI WKH µDEVWUDFW LGHDV¶ FDWHJRU\ LQ WKLV FDVH´ 7KH
SUREOHPZLWKWKLVLVWKDWWKH&RXUWJDYHDYHU\DPELJXRXVGHILQLWLRQRIWKH
WHUP DEVWUDFW OHDYLQJ OLWWOH JXLGDQFH WR WKH ORZHU FRXUWV DQG RSHQLQJ WKH
GRRUVIRUDYHU\EURDGLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ0RUHRYHUWKH&RXUWJDYHQRFOHDU
GHILQLWLRQRIDJHQHULFFRPSXWHU
$VRI-XQHDERXWRI)HGHUDO&LUFXLWDQGGLVWULFWFRXUW
GHFLVLRQV KHDUG RQ   JURXQGV KDYH LQYDOLGDWHG WKH SDWHQWV DW LVVXH LQ
ZKROH RU LQ SDUW IXUWKHUPRUH WKHUH LV DQ H[WUHPHO\ KLJK VXFFHVV UDWH RI
PRWLRQVRQWKHSOHDGLQJ:KHQD PRWLRQRQWKHSOHDGLQJVLVJUDQWHGD
FDVHFDQEHDGMXGLFDWHGEHIRUHGLVFRYHU\DQGHYHQVRPHWLPHVEHIRUHFODLP
FRQVWUXFWLRQZKLFKJLYHVDSDWHQWHHOHVVRIDFKDQFHWRGHIHQGKLVRUKHU
SURSHUW\ ULJKWV $GGLWLRQDOO\ EDVHG RQ DQ DUWLFOH IURP -XQH  RYHU
SDWHQWDSSOLFDWLRQVKDGEHHQUHMHFWHGEDVHGRQAliceDQGRYHU


  Id. DW
  Id. DW
  Id. DW
  Id.DW
  6DFKVsupraQRWH ³7KHIHGHUDOFRXUWVWKH3DWHQW7ULDODQG$SSHDO%RDUGDQGWKH86372
DUHXVLQJWKHYHU\ODFNRIDGHILQLWLRQWROLEHUDOO\H[SDQGWKHFRQWRXUVRIDEVWUDFWLGHDVWRFRYHUHYHU\
WKLQJIURPFRPSXWHUDQLPDWLRQWRGDWDEDVHDUFKLWHFWXUHWRGLJLWDOSKRWRJUDSKPDQDJHPHQWDQGHYHQWR
VDIHW\V\VWHPVIRUDXWRPRELOHV´ 
. See generally Alice Corp.6&W  
  6DFKV supra QRWH  ³7KH VXFFHVV UDWH RI PRWLRQV RQ WKH SOHDGLQJV LQFOXGLQJ PRWLRQV WR
GLVPLVV DQG MXGJPHQWV RQ WKH SOHDGLQJV  LV H[WUHPHO\ LPSUHVVLYH RI GHIHQVH PRWLRQV JUDQWHG
LQYDOLGDWLQJRIDVVHUWHGSDWHQWV´ 7KHVHVWDWLVWLFVKDYHUHPDLQHGUHODWLYHO\VWDJQDQWD\HDUODWHU
5REHUW56DFKVTwo Years after $OLFH: A Survey of the Impact of a “Minor Case” (Part 1))(1:,&.
 :(67 %,/6., %/2* -XQH KWWSZZZELOVNLEORJFRPEORJWZR\HDUVDIWHUDOLFH
DVXUYH\RIWKHLPSDFWRIDPLQRUFDVHKWPO ³7KH SHUFHQWDJH RI SDWHQWV LQYDOLGDWHG KDV DOVR EHHQ
FRQVWDQW\HDURYHU\HDUYV´ 7KUHHIHGHUDOMXGJHVKDYHUHFHQWO\FULWLFL]HGWKHAliceGHFL
VLRQ VWDWLQJ WKDW WKH WZRSDUWWHVW IRU DQDO\]LQJ SDWHQW YDOLGLW\ LV WRR VXEMHFWLYH DQG LW KDV SURPSWHG
KXQGUHGVRISDWHQWLQYDOLGLW\PRWLRQVLQWKHLUGLVWULFWV'RURWK\$WNLQVFederal Judges Slam Alice at
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applications had been abandoned. 175 If an application is abandoned before
publication, the public does not benefit because there is no disclosure;
however, if it is abandoned after publication, a company risks disclosing an
unpatented invention to a competitor. 176 Moreover, one of the most shocking parts of the Alice decision is that in no part of the opinion does the
Court mention the word “software.” This is noteworthy due to Alice’s dire
effects on software patents. 177
Soon after Alice, the Federal Circuit issued an opinion holding in favor of the patentee. 178 In this case, the court stated that the claims satisfied
step two of the test delineated in Mayo/Alice. 179 The court held that the
claims were patent-eligible because
They do not merely recite the performance of some business practice
known from the pre- Internet world along with the requirement to perform it on the Internet. Instead, the claimed solution is necessarily rooted
in computer technology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer networks. 180

Although this decision seemed to be a beacon of hope for patent owners, an article written in 2015 stated that only nine district court opinions
have used DDR as precedent to find patent eligibility, while over thirty
court opinions have cited DDR as inapplicable. 181 Moreover, in the year
since the article published, the Federal Circuit decided more than twice as
many cases as the previous year, yet it still found very few cases with patent-eligible claims; this means that since Alice, there has been little case
law a patent owner can rely on if his or her software patent is challenged. 182
175. Robert R. Sachs, Two Years after Alice: A Survey of the Impact of a “Minor Case” (Part 2),
FENWICK & WEST: BILSKI BLOG (June 20, 2016), http://www.bilskiblog.com/blog/2016/06/two-yearsafter-alice-a-survey-of-the-impact-of-a-minor-case-part-2.html
(basing
statistic
on published applications, which, according to the author, have historically accounted for 60% of all
patent applications; consequently, he contends that the numbers are likely higher).
176. Id.
177. See Austin Underhill, Who Is Alice, And Why Is She Driving Patent Attorneys Mad as Hatters?, ABOVE THE LAW (Feb. 19, 2016, 1:52 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2016/02/who-is-alice-andwhy-is-she-driving-patent-attorneys-mad-as-hatters. The Alice decision has also had a great effect on
business method patents. As of June 2016, the PTAB has granted 83.6% of petitions seeking Covered
Business Method (CBM) review that considered a § 101 argument on the merits; the PTAB reaffirmed
96% of those decisions as Final Decisions.). Sachs, supra note 13.
178. DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
179. Id. at 1257–59.
180. Id. at 1257.
181. Sachs, supra note 13.
182. Sachs, supra note 13; See Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
This recent case possibly brings clarification to Section 101 jurisprudence. The Federal Circuit determined that the claims at issue were directed to a self-referential table for a computer database rather
than an abstract idea. Id. at 1335–36 (“We do not read Alice to broadly hold that all improvements in
computer-related technology are inherently abstract and, therefore, must be considered at step two . . . .
For that reason, the first step in the Alice inquiry in this case asks whether the focus of the claims is on
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This high rate of invalidation raises concerns for inventors. Why
would an inventor waste his or her time and money filing for a patent application, when there is a high likelihood that it will be invalidated? Furthermore, what does this new jurisprudence do to the presumption of
validity? 183 Is this presumption merely a hollow word? Innovation is vital
to the wellbeing of society. Furthermore, the Constitution enumerates Congress’ power to promote the sciences; 184 therefore, courts should not be
weakening patent rights, they should be encouraging patent rights.
Besides invalidating patents with its broad approach to § 101, the Supreme Court also seems to intermix the analysis for patent eligibility under
§ 101 with the analysis for patentability under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103
(hereinafter “§ 102” and “§103,” respectively). 185 According to § 102, an
invention must be novel. 186 This means that the claimed invention cannot
have been “patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on
sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of
the claimed invention.” 187 Section 103 states that an inventor may not receive a patent if the “subject matter as a whole would have been obvious
before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having
ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.” 188 The secthe specific asserted improvement in computer capabilities (i.e., the self-referential table for a computer
database) or, instead, on a process that qualifies as an ‘abstract idea’ for which computers are invoked
merely as a tool.”). In another recent case, the Federal Circuit discussed the problems with abstraction,
and proceeded to analyze the claims at issue by examining earlier cases “in which a similar or parallel
descriptive nature can be seen.” Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., No. 2015-1180, 2016
WL 6440387 at *4, (Fed. Cir. Nov. 1, 2016) (“The problem with articulating a single, universal definition of ‘abstract idea’ is that it is difficult to fashion a workable definition to be applied to as-yetunknown cases with as-yet-unknown inventions. That is not for want of trying; to the extent the efforts
so far have been unsuccessful it is because they often end up using alternative but equally abstract terms
or are overly narrow.”). See also id. at *4 n.1 (“For examples, compare [In re Bilski] reaffirming ‘machine-or-transformation’ as the § 101 test for process claims, with [Bilski v. Kappos] indicating that
‘machine-or-transformation’ is perhaps one possible test, but not the only one. See also the several
opinions in this court’s [CLS Bank International v. Alice Corp.].”).
183. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2016).
184. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
185. Eric Guttag, Ignorance Is Not Bliss: Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, IP WATCHDOG
(July 25, 2014),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/07/25/ignorance-is-not-bliss-alice-corp-v-cls-bankinternational/id=50517. See also Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1304. (“We recognize that, in evaluating the
significance of additional steps, the §101 patent-eligibility inquiry and, say, the §102 novelty inquiry
might sometimes overlap.”).
186. 35 U.S.C. § 102.
187. Id. The claimed invention also cannot have been described in a patent issues under section
151, or in an application for a patent published under 122(b), wherein the patent or application was filed
before the effective filing date of the claimed invention. It is important to note that this is the language
used post-American Invents Act of 2011.
188. 35 U.S.C. § 103; see Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 1 (1966) (delineating factors to determine the obviousness framework).
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ond part of the analysis in the Alice decision, which is the quest for the
inventive concept, seems to combine the analyses required under each statute. In part two of the test, the Court states that abstract ideas are patentineligible when the additional steps of the claims are routine and well understood by those in the scientific community. 189 By its very nature, determining whether or not steps are routine and well understood by those
skilled in the art requires consideration of novelty and non-obviousness. 190
When the § 101 patent-eligibility inquiry overlaps with the § 102 and
§ 103 analyses, there is a risk of creating significantly greater legal uncertainty. This combination of sections makes it easier to challenge a patent’s
validity on § 101 grounds. For example, a challenger could use a combination of the written description and the prior art to allege that the patent
claims are routine and conventional. 191 It also ignores the legislative history
behind Congress’ 1952 Patent Act, which states that anything under the sun
made by man is patentable. Furthermore, by re-codifying the patent law,
Congress has shown that patent eligible subject matter is only one requirement needed to obtain a patent.
Finally, when the Supreme Court weakens patent rights, it affects
Congress’ enumerated ability to promote science. The Supreme Court’s
declaratory judgment jurisprudence arguably weakens patent rights. In
order to file a declaratory judgment action in the district courts, the party
filing the suit must establish the existence of an actual case or controversy
between itself and the opposing party. 192 In a patent case, a declaratory
judgment is a legally binding declaration, in which a court conclusively
affirms the rights of a party (e.g., determines a patent’s validity or declares
non-infringement). A cornerstone case in the interpretation of this law occurred in Medimmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. 193
In Medimmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., MedImmune had a licensing
agreement with Genentech, which covered an existing patent and a thenpending patent application. 194 When the USPTO granted the pending application, Genentech sent MedImmune a letter stating it expected them to pay

189. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2359 (2014).
190. See Jason Rantanen, Guest Post: The Blurring of §§ 101 and 103—A Double-Edged Sword
that Cuts the Other Way, PATENTLYO (Oct. 6, 2015), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/10/blurring%C2%A7%C2%A7-double.html (“In Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1298, for example, Justice Breyer cited
admissions in the specification that the processes for determining the level of metabolites in a patient’s
blood were ‘well known in the art’.”).
191. Id.
192. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2016).
193. MedImmune v. Genentech, 549 U.S. 118, 118 (2007).
194. Id. at 121.
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royalties. 195 MedImmune alleged that Genentech’s patent was invalid and
that their product did not infringe its claims; however, they still paid royalties on the patent. 196 The petitioner then sought declaratory relief. 197 The
Court considered whether a patent licensee had to first terminate its licensing agreement in order to satisfy the actual controversy requirement under
the Declaratory Judgment Act. 198 The Court reversed the Federal Circuit’s
decision and held that MedImmune was not required to break its licensing
agreement in order to seek a declaratory judgment in federal court, which
would render the underlying patent invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed. 199
Before this case, the Federal Circuit applied a reasonable apprehension standard in order to determine whether or not the case-or-controversy
requirement had been satisfied. 200 In its place, the Court held that they must
consider “whether the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that
there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal
interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a
declaratory judgment.” 201 By considering all the circumstances, the Court
has essentially lowered the bar for bringing a declaratory judgment action. 202 In lowering the bar for bringing a declaratory judgment action, a
licensee has the advantage of remaining in good standing, all while attacking the validity of a patent. 203 The consequence of this is that the bargaining power of both parties entering a licensing agreement is greatly
shifted. 204 Ultimately, the shift in negotiation power creates a huge imbalance. 205
As of now, there are not many consequences to challenging the validity of a licensor’s patent. 206 This may discourage potential licensing agreements, which, in turn, could possibly hinder future innovation.207
Essentially, “the overhead cost associated with licensing a patent is now
195. Id.
196. Id. at 121–22.
197. Id. at 122.
198. Id. at 128.
199. Id. at 137.
200. See id. at 132 n.11.
201. Id. at 127.
202. Nicholas G. Smith, Medimmune v. Genentech: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Supreme
Court’s Continued Assault on the Patentee, 15 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 503, 527 (2011).
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
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greater because of the imbalance of power between patentees and licensees,
which decreases the value of a patent sought to be licensed.” 208 Another
major issue with the MedImmune decision is that it makes it more difficult
to monetize patents. 209 After MedImmune, there is now a risk of having a
patent declared invalid before licensing or litigation ever occurs. 210 This
results in a shift in the balance of power in licensing negations; “the risk
partially shifts away from the licensee to the patent holder.” 211 Because
value is a function of risk, the value of the patent could be adversely affected. 212
Additionally, attorneys will now have to consider alternative contract
provisions in order to avoid declaratory judgments actions. 213 This could
greatly increase transactional costs and add risk to the licensing process
since parties may be apprehensive to enter into a licensing agreement with
these provisions. 214 Furthermore, the possibility of litigation increases, as a
licensee has little to lose from accepting a license before turning immediately to the courts. 215 Companies are discouraged from seeking licenses for
their patents to an expansive group, considering they may be faced with
multiple validity and non-infringement challenges. 216 Potential licensors
will have to take extra time to consider each and every possible licensee
before entering into any agreement. 217 This could cause a problem because
patents may be transferred to the least risky user instead of a valuable entity. 218 In sum, the Supreme Court has not given the proper deference to
Congress, and has in turn made it difficult for an inventor to enforce his or
her patent- an effect contrary to Congressional intent.

208. Id.
209. Peter Jay, Removing Incentives for Technology Transfer: Medimmune v. Genentech, 5 BUFF.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 69, 83 (2007).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 81.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 82.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. For another analysis on the potential impact of MedImmune, see Ahmend & Diner, In the
Aftermath of MedImmune v. Genentech, Is It All Doom and Gloom for Licensors or Are There Rays of
(Apr.
2007),
Hope
in
the
Future?
FINNEGAN
http://www.finnegan.com/resources/articles/articlesdetail.aspx?news=6c82c943-80d3-44d1-8587fc608b1ff322; see also Scott G. Greene, The Return of the King: Rethinking Lear, Medimmune, and the
Effects of Licensee Estoppel in the Context of Aia Post-Grant Procedures, 71 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM.
L. 81, 105 (2015) (“The jurisprudence following MedImmune has resulted in a significant broadening of
scenarios under which a licensee or prospective licensee is able to bring a patent invalidity challenge.”).
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%HVLGHVPLVLQWHUSUHWLQJWKHOHJDODVSHFWVRISDWHQWODZWKH&RXUWKDV
DOVR PLVLQWHUSUHWHG WKH VFLHQFH EHKLQG FHUWDLQ FDVHV ,Q RUGHU WR PDNH D
SURSHU MXGLFLDO GHFLVLRQ FRXUWV DUH UHTXLUHG WR XQGHUVWDQG WKH IDFWV RI D
FDVH,QSDWHQWODZWKHIDFWVRIDFDVHFDQUHO\KHDYLO\RQVFLHQWLILFDQDO\
VLV 7KH 6XSUHPH &RXUW KDV KDG GLIILFXOW\ IXOO\ FRPSUHKHQGLQJ VFLHQWLILF
DQDO\VLVDVSHUIHFWO\GHPRQVWUDWHGLQAssociation for Molecular Pathology
v. Myriad Genetics, Inc 0\ULDG *HQHWLFV ORFDWHG LVRODWHG DQG VH
TXHQFHG WZR KXPDQ FDQFHU VXVFHSWLELOLW\ JHQHV %5&$ DQG %5&$
PXWDWLRQV LQ WKHVH WZR JHQHV FDQ JUHDWO\ LQFUHDVH WKH ULVNV RI EUHDVW DQG
RYDULDQFDQFHU2QDSSHDOWKH6XSUHPH&RXUWKDGWRDQVZHUWKHIROORZ
LQJTXHVWLRQV ZKHWKHURUQRWLVRODWHG'1$ZDVSDWHQWDEOHXQGHU
DQGDQG ZKHWKHURUQRWSDWHQWFODLPVUHODWLQJWRF'1$ZHUHHOLJL
EOHXQGHU
,QWKLVGHFLVLRQWKH6XSUHPH&RXUWKHOGWKDWLVRODWHG'1$LVQRWSD
WHQWDEOH VXEMHFW PDWWHU VLQFH LW IHOO ZLWKLQ WKH ODZ RI QDWXUH H[FHSWLRQ
7KH &RXUW DUJXHG WKDW 0\ULDG GLG QRW ³FUHDWH RU DOWHU DQ\ RI WKH JHQHWLF
LQIRUPDWLRQHQFRGHGLQWKH%5&$DQG%5&$JHQHV´QRUGLGWKH\DOWHU
WKH JHQHWLF VWUXFWXUH RI '1$ $FFRUGLQJ WR WKH &RXUW 0\ULDG GLG QRW
FUHDWH DQ\WKLQJ ³>W@R EH VXUH LW IRXQG DQ LPSRUWDQW DQG XVHIXO JHQH EXW
VHSDUDWLQJWKDWJHQHIURPLWVVXUURXQGLQJJHQHWLFPDWHULDOLVQRWDQDFWRI
LQYHQWLRQ´2QWKHFRQWUDU\WKH6XSUHPH&RXUWDOVRKHOGWKDW³F'1$LV
QRWDµSURGXFWRIQDWXUH¶DQGLVSDWHQWHOLJLEOHXQGHUH[FHSWLQVRIDU
DV YHU\ VKRUW VHULHV RI '1$ PD\ KDYH QR LQWHUYHQLQJ LQWURQV WR UHPRYH
ZKHQ FUHDWLQJ F'1$´7KH &RXUW UHDVRQHG WKDW F'1$ GLIIHUHG IURP
QDWXUDO'1$VLQFHLQF'1$³WKHQRQFRGLQJUHJLRQVKDYHEHHQUHPRYHG´
WKHUHIRUH D ³ODE WHFKQLFLDQ XQTXHVWLRQDEO\ FUHDWHV VRPHWKLQJ QHZ ZKHQ
F'1$LVPDGH´
7KHUHDUHGLYLGHGRSLQLRQVRQWKHSROLF\LPSOLFDWLRQVEHKLQGSDWHQWLQJ
LVRODWHG '1$ KRZHYHU WKH PDLQ LVVXH LV QRW QHFHVVDULO\ WKH &RXUW¶V
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ultimate conclusion, but rather the reasoning behind it. Perhaps most members of the Court fell asleep during their freshman year biology course, as
perhaps some of this Note’s readers did. 228 Consequently, it is important to
briefly discuss both isolated DNA as well as cDNA.
Genes carry the instructions to make proteins. 229 They are made up of
DNA, and they can vary in size from a few hundred bases to more than two
million bases. 230 In nature, the human genome contains about 3 billion base
pairs in total. 231 These base pairs reside in the twenty-three pairs of chromosomes contained in the nucleus of our cells. 232 Chromosomes consist of
hundreds to thousands of genes. 233 “Each of the estimated 30,000 genes in
the human genome makes an average of three proteins.” 234 In nature, genes
clearly do not exist in a vacuum. An isolated fragment of DNA is not naturally occurring, and locating, sequencing, and isolating one specific gene
out of 30,000 genes can be a rigorous process. The Supreme Court even
points out, “isolating DNA from the human genome severs chemical bonds
and thereby creates a nonnaturally occurring molecule.” 235 But still, the
Court holds that the isolated DNA claims cover naturally occurring phenomena, which seems somewhat paradoxical. 236
The Court comes to this conclusion because the genetic information
encoded in the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes itself was not altered. 237 Assuming, arguendo, that this is the proper analysis, and that judges should look
to the underlying genetic information, the Court should have come to a
different conclusion with respect to the patentability of cDNA. Here, the
antidote to the politics of the human gene patenting debate, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 6th, 2013),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/02/an-antidote-to-the-politics-of-the-human-gene-patenting-debate/
(arguing that patenting isolated human DNA does not 1) inhibit innovation, 2) inhibit genetic research,
or 3) inhibit future technologies, such as personalized medicine).
228. It is worth mentioning that the syllabus of the decision refers to synthetically created “exonsonly strands of nucleotides” as “composite DNA (cDNA).” Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2109. In molecular
biology, cDNA stands for complementary DNA; Noah Feldman, The Supreme Court’s Bad Science on
Gene Patents, BLOOMBERG LAW, (June 13 2013), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2013-0613/the-supreme-court-s-bad-science-on-gene-patents; Noam Prywes, The Supreme Court’s Sketchy
Science,
SLATE,
http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/science/2013/06/supreme_court_patent_case_science
_the_justices_misunderstand_molecular_biology.html.
229. The Human Genome Project Completion: Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L HUMAN
GENOME RESEARCH INST. (Oct. 30, 2010).
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2118. (emphasis added).
236. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2116–19.
237. Id.
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Court argues that a person creates something new when cDNA is made,
mostly because cDNA differs from natural DNA in that cDNA does not
contain the non-coding regions. 238 The Court focuses more on how the
cDNA is made, rather than its underlying genetic information.
cDNA is made from mRNA. 239 During transcription, RNA polymerase II uses a strand of DNA as a template to make a complementary strand
of RNA, called pre-mRNA. 240 In nature, pre-mRNA undergoes a process
called splicing. 241 The purpose of splicing is to remove introns, which are
sequences of RNA that do not contain instructions for protein construction. 242 The remaining segments are called exons, which are the part of the
mRNA that contain instructions for protein assembly. 243 The spliced
mRNA can be referred to as primary mRNA. 244 How does this relate to
cDNA? Well, cDNA is usually generated by the enzyme reverse transcriptase, which uses the information in primary mRNA to produce a complementary DNA strand. 245 Complementary DNA contains the same proteincoding information found in a segment of “natural” DNA; 246 therefore, the
analysis for cDNA should really be no different from the Court’s analysis
for isolated DNA.
It is worth mentioning that, in his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia
wrote, “I join the judgment of the Court, and all of its opinion except Part
I–A and some portions of the rest of the opinion going into fine details of
molecular biology. I am unable to affirm those details on my own
knowledge or even my own belief.” 247 In a criminal or any other civil case,
the judge is expected to know and fully understand the facts and how they
apply to existing law. Why shouldn’t the same standard be held for a patent
matter? In a case that affects genetic researching and the biotechnology
industry, 248 the Court should have been able to understand the actual biological facts in order to make a proper decision. 249

238. Id. at 2119.
239. See
Isolation
and
Use
of
cDNA
Clones,
http://wwwusers.med.cornell.edu/~jawagne/cDNA_cloning.html.
240. See Eukaryotic Gene Transcription: Going from DNA to mRNA, KHAN ACADEMY,
https://www.khanacademy.org/test-prep/mcat/biomolecules/dna/a/eukaryotic-gene-transcription-goingfrom-dna-to-mrna
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. See Isolation and Use of cDNA Clones, supra note 239.
246. Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111 (2013).
247. Id. at 2120.
248. See Esteban Burrone, Patents at the Core: the Biotech Business, WIPO,
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IV. CONCLUSION
Innovation is the key to success in this globalized world. Over the past
few years, the Supreme Court has made many errors in patent jurisprudence, which has put innovation at risk. 250 Is stripping jurisdiction from the
Supreme Court the answer? Congress would not be precluded from passing
this type of jurisdiction-stripping legislation. Furthermore, certain ideological and policy concerns stimulated by previous jurisdiction-stripping statutes are not at issue here. In the simplest scenario, the Federal Circuit
would be the final arbiter of patent appeals, still allowing for uniform jurisprudence and judicial checks on any equal protection, due process, or separation of powers claims, if any constitutional claims ever were to arise.
Although the Supreme Court can strip jurisdiction with respect to the
Court’s ability to entertain patent appeals, the real question lies in whether
or not Congress should pass this legislation. Stripping jurisdiction is a controversial idea, and some may argue that it may be too soon to make that
judgment. What is clear, however, is that there needs to be some reform in
the Supreme Court’s patent law jurisprudence. Maybe a simple solution
would be to ensure that at least one justice on the Court is registered to
practice before the USPTO. Or, another possible solution would be to appoint a technical advisor to the justices, who could assist the Court in interpreting any scientifically complex case.
The idea of having a scientifically trained person on a patent court is
not novel. For example, in the German patent system, there are twenty-nine
boards in which judges of the Federal Patent Court can sit, which include
nullity boards, technical boards of appeal, boards of appeal for trademarks,
http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/documents/patents_biotech_fulltext.html (“Compared with other major
industries that also rely on research and development (R&D), such as the chemical industry, for which
the ratio of R&D expenditure to total revenues is approximately 5%, or the pharmaceutical industry, for
which the equivalent figure is generally no more than 13%, biotechnology companies generally invest a
significantly higher proportion of their revenues in R&D (often between 40% and 50%). As in any
research-based industry, the protection of research results becomes a major issue.”).
249. Mayo and Myriad have also impacted the ability to acquire and secure biotech related patents.
Sachs, supra note 13 (displaying figure directed to patents challenged in Federal Courts, which shows
that 53% of biotech related patents have been invalidated under § 101).
250. See Ryan Davis, Kappos Calls for Abolition of Section 101 Of Patent Act, LAW360 (Apr. 12,
2016, 4:32 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/783604/kappos-calls-for-abolition-of-section-101-ofpatent-act. According to this article, David Kappos, the former director of the USPTO, called for the
abolition of Section 101 of the Patent Act, stating decisions like Alice on the issue are a “real mess” and
threaten patent protection for key U.S. industries. He stated that the Supreme Court’s decisions in
Mayo, Myriad, and Alice, along with the lower interpretations of these decisions by the lower courts,
have made it too difficult to procure patents on biotechnology and software inventions. According to
Kappos, foreign patent officials have reacted with “bemusement” while watching the U.S. invalidate
patents under Section 101. According to Kappos, foreign companies competing with American businesses see a golden opportunity in the reduced patent protection for software and biotechnology.
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a juridical board of appeal, a board of appeal for utility models, and a board
of appeal in plant variety cases. 251 On this court, there are currently 118
judges; these judges are a mixture of lawyers and scientists. 252 These technical judges have all the same duties and privileges of a professional judge;
they sit on all cases involved in the properties of a technical invention. 253
The implementation of technically trained judges has existed in specialized
patent courts in various countries, like Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, and
Denmark. 254 In the United Kingdom, patent law judges usually have scientific and technical training; however, they are not officially referred to as
technical judges. 255 Actually, an advantage to stripping jurisdiction could
be that Congress would have the power to alter the Federal Circuit so that
is better emulates the European system.
It might be worth Congress’s time and energy to study the patent systems of other countries; however, that is for another note. Although there
may be other solutions to an increasingly foreboding situation, stripping
jurisdiction from the Supreme Court is a rational consideration. Due to
their importance in the American and global economy, patents should at
least be analyzed neutrally. Supreme Court opinions in recent years have
put patent law on shaky grounds. The Supreme Court has not granted deference to the congressionally created Federal Circuit, nor has it granted
deference to Congress’ legislative intent. Furthermore, the Court occasionally misunderstands the science behind the case law, thereby limiting its
ability to communicate clear, uniform rules. It’s time to reform the judiciary in order to stop the cessation, and promote innovation.

251. Functions,
BUNDES
PATENT
GERICHT,
https://www.bundespatentgericht.de/cms/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2&Itemid=
8&lang=en.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Xavier Seuba, Inside Views: CEIPI Launches Training Program for Technical Judges of
Unified Patent Court, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Sept. 29, 2015),
http://www.ip-watch.org/2015/09/29/ceipi-launches-training-program-for-technical-judges-of-unifiedpatent-court/.
255. Id. The Unified Patent Court would also seat technical judges.

